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Abstract
This article examines the use of country information in 
determining claims for refugee status based on sexual ori-
entation or gender identity. Limitations to country informa-
tion remove diverse individual experiences from the “histor-
ical record” and obstruct marginalized individuals’ ability 
to prove their claims for protection. Discrimination and 
marginalization may be echoed and perpetuated within 
country information itself, which privileges certain voices 
over others. MD (same-sex-oriented males: risk) India CG 
[2014], the United Kingdom’s current “country guidance” 
decision on claims for protection by same-sex oriented men 
from India, is examined in light of these themes.
Résumé
Cet article étudie l’utilisation de renseignements sur le 
pays d’origine afin de déterminer les demandes de statut 
de réfugié en lien avec l’orientation sexuelle et l’identité de 
genre. Les limites en matière de renseignements sur le pays 
d’origine effacent du registre historique diverses expériences 
individuelles et font obstruction à la capacité qu’ont des 
personnes marginalisées de justifier leur demande de pro-
tection. La discrimination et la marginalisation peuvent 
être répétées et prorogées par l’information même délivrée 
par les pays, qui privilégie certaines voix sur d’autres. À la 
lumière de ces thèmes de réflexion est étudié le document 
du Upper Tribunal (Royaume-Uni) MD (same-sex oriented 
males : risk) India CG [2014], qui établit les lignes direc-
trices actuelles de pays en matière de décision concernant 
les demandes de protection pour les hommes homosexuels 
provenant d’Inde.
Introduction
Country information is an essential part of refugee sta-tus determination (rsd). Information about coun-tries from which asylum seekers have fled (“coun-
tries of origin”) can help to prove that claimed experiences 
of past persecution occurred and that asylum seekers would 
be at risk of harm in future.2 However, country information 
must not be used uncritically. It can never provide an objec-
tive, exhaustive guide to events in a particular country, as if 
recounted by an omniscient narrator of events. All sources 
of country information are selective, edited accounts of par-
ticular circumstances, of varying focus and breadth. These 
accounts must be interpreted rather than merely taken at 
face value, having due regard to their biases, priorities, and 
intended usage.
The potential of country information to mislead, and 
the corresponding need for informed and close analysis, is 
particularly acute in assessing the claims of asylum seekers 
whose claims for protection are based on their real or per-
ceived sexual orientation or gender identity (referred to in 
short as “lgbtq asylum seekers”). Sexuality is fluid, intensely 
personal, and potentially experienced in highly variable ways 
from person to person and within each individual’s own 
lifetime.3 Country information can provide only limited cor-
roboration for how individual sexual acts or identities will 
be experienced, valued, or treated, or for the potentially sig-
nificant distinctions between sexual minority groups (and 
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how such groups are perceived by agents of persecution) in 
countries of origin.
This article examines the use of country information in 
assessing claims for protection based on sexual orientation or 
gender identity. In particular, this article discusses the extent 
to which country information may be distorted by “privilege” 
and insufficient regard to diverse, individual, and intersec-
tional experiences of sexuality and gender, with the United 
Kingdom Upper Tribunal’s “country guidance” decision in 
MD (same-sex-oriented males: risk) India CG [2014]4 (“MD”) 
analyzed as a case study. This article draws upon the author’s 
experiences as a former researcher and solicitor with an Aus-
tralian law firm with a significant practice in refugee law. 
Country Information: History and Controversies
“Country information” is information about other nations 
used in rsd. It is not only used to examine conditions in 
countries of origin; it may extend, for example, to informa-
tion about countries through which asylum seekers have 
travelled in order to reach the jurisdiction in which their 
claims for protection are assessed. Country information can 
include very general information, like information about the 
history, geography, or demographics of a particular nation or 
a particular region. It can also be very specific, like informa-
tion about particular locations, events, or individuals. It can 
arise from any number of sources. Although reports from 
governments and ngos have traditionally been used in rsd, 
increasingly widespread access to the Internet and social 
media has expanded the range of materials used to corrobo-
rate claims about country conditions (and claims for asylum 
in general),5 including blog posts and information provided 
via social media. It can be produced for a variety of purposes: 
to chronicle conditions in a particular country, to draw atten-
tion to particular situations or particular types of abuse, or 
to support claims for asylum, whether claims by particular 
groups from particular countries or individual claims.
The weight afforded to particular sources of country 
information will vary from source to source. Reports by well-
established international ngos like Human Rights Watch or 
Amnesty International, or the United States Department of 
State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,6 may be 
afforded greater weight in decision-making because of the 
stature of the organizations that have produced them,7 even 
over specialist groups looking into particular types of abuse 
or speaking out on behalf of particular groups.8 This is prob-
lematic. This weighting reinforces a professionalized, expert-
driven, and “technocratic” model of fact-finding in human 
rights advocacy in which elite (and/or Western) voices, con-
cerns, and methods are privileged.9
Country information is essential in rsd because it pro-
vides necessary context for asylum seekers’ claims to fear 
persecution if removed from the countries in which they have 
sought asylum. Country information cannot, however, resolve 
each and every case on its own; “individualized” assessment 
is key to the appropriate functioning of rsd.10 In particular, 
the “credibility” of asylum seekers’ claims about why they fear 
harm in their countries of origin must be examined; decision-
makers must determine whether asylum seekers are telling 
the truth about who they are and why they are seeking asylum. 
Furthermore, country information cannot provide an exhaus-
tive, comprehensive, and objective account of every instance 
of persecution in a particular nation, especially where such 
persecution is merely feared or prospective. 
Like any other form of fact-finding or research in human 
rights advocacy, country information will inevitably be 
shaped by “politics, culture, judgment, power, and many 
other dimensions,” rather than a mere account of the “facts.”11 
Country information may exaggerate the scale or extent of 
particular abuses, in order to draw attention to a cause or 
puncture public complacency. Alternatively, ngos operating 
in countries of origin may downplay some abuses, or pre-
sent them in more careful and measured language, so as to 
emphasize positive trends, maintain good relationships with 
local governments, or cater to the prejudices of intended 
audiences (within the country of origin or elsewhere). These 
practices, even where they serve a political purpose or make 
sense in a context of partial improvement, may present 
an inadvertently rosy picture of conditions (and endanger 
claims for asylum) when viewed outside that context. A por-
trait of improving conditions may be interpreted as a portrait 
of good conditions, when nothing of the sort was intended.
Country information may also be produced by govern-
ments, such as the Immigration and Refugee Board of 
Canada (irbc)’s National Documentation Packages12 and 
research reports collating information in response to specific 
inquiries,13 or the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (dfat)’s reports from overseas embassies.14 This 
information may either replicate factors that distort ngo 
reporting (for example, where, as in irbc reports, official 
reports rely upon collation of material produced in unofficial 
sources) or prove subject to governments’ desire to present 
other nations in a positive or negative light, depending on 
their alliances and political interests.15 Hence, both the col-
lation and the production of information by countries of 
asylum may be problematic. Even government decisions on 
which forms of country information to prioritize, and which 
forms to downplay, may be subject to these same pressures. 
For example, Australia’s decision to dictate that rsd officials 
must take account of dfat’s country information assess-
ments, with no equivalent dictate to consider any other form 
of country information, was understood and reported as an 
effort to “toughen up the asylum seeker claims process.”16
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Calls for caution in how country information is employed 
and interpreted are nothing new.17 Goodwin-Gill and 
McAdam, for example, have observed that although docu-
mentary evidence, including country information, “has a 
seductive air, often seeming sufficient to decide the case,” 
country information that is not related personally to the 
applicant “often gives only a general impression, more or less 
detailed, of what is going on.”18 This “seductive air” derives 
from the seeming certainty and clarity of country informa-
tion, as compared to the perceived subjectivity or unreli-
ability of witness testimony.19 Like other asserted “facts” in 
human rights advocacy, this appeal of country information 
derives from “the residual appeal of the notion that there 
are things that are ‘true,’ ‘evident,’ or ‘concrete’ when all else 
appears fickle, contestable and subjective.”20 Where it is 
frequently perceived that “refugee claimants tell lies’21—a 
particularly common and pernicious view in the context of 
claims based on sexual orientation22—and other forms of 
corroboration may be lacking, country information bears 
the sheen of perceived objectivity. This allows it to play a cru-
cial role in the “surveillance of authenticity” that dominates 
contemporary rsd.23 Nonetheless, as Macklin has written, 
country information “usually paint[s] a canvas with broad, 
crude brush strokes.”24 To this end, the Hungarian Helsinki 
Committee have asserted that country of origin information 
“cannot reflect the entire reality in countries of origin,” that 
no source can be regarded as entirely objective, and that 
“coi is not a lie detector; it provides the wider context for the 
assessment of an asylum claim, yet it cannot tell whether the 
applicant is truthful, neither can it decide whether the claim 
is well-founded.”25 
There is another line of critique that stresses the uneasy 
historical antecedents of “country information.” The col-
lection and collation of information was a crucial means to 
establish and maintain colonial control;26 the contemporary 
practice of building “archives” of country information cata-
loguing human rights abuses, including abuses on account of 
sexual orientation or gender identity, have been questioned 
as the potential reiteration of “older colonial tropes” of the 
essentialized, intolerant, archaic “other” situated in contrast 
to the tolerant, accepting jurisdiction of refuge27—jurisdic-
tions that, in the context of claims on the basis of sexual ori-
entation or gender identity, have disproportionately proven 
to be former colonial powers or settler colonies.28
Issues have also raised with the use of country informa-
tion in assessing claims for asylum based on sexual orienta-
tion or gender identity. The notorious use of tourist guides 
as evidence of the toleration of same-sex sexual conduct has 
drawn widespread condemnation.29 Millbank has noted 
difficulties in drawing conclusions about “plausibility” of 
claims from country information,30 including deeming 
relationships to be implausible on the basis of endemic 
societal homophobia or criminalization—a form of reason-
ing under which “the claim of virtually every asylum seeker 
who has had, or attempted, a same-sex relationship in their 
country of origin is implausible because of the inherent risk 
it entailed.”31 LaViolette has examined the history of, and 
ongoing difficulties within, Canadian usage of country infor-
mation regarding lgbtq asylum seekers,32 while Rehaag has 
stressed the need to “disaggregate” the treatment of different 
groups within the sweeping category of “lgbtq” in country 
information.33 While building on these pioneering works, 
however, this article differs in several respects: its integration 
of practical insights from the author’s experiences as a legal 
practitioner in Australia, its focus on questions of “profile,” 
“privilege,” and intersectionality, and its integration of theo-
retical critique with close analysis of one particular decision 
(the Upper Tribunal’s decision in MD).
Despite this history of criticism and debate, the use of 
country information still remains problematic, even given 
improvements in this regard (in particular, in the documen-
tation of abuses against sexual minorities) since the early 
1990s.34 As borne out by the author’s experiences in practice, 
decision-makers still assume that country information is 
exhaustive, accurate, and universal in its application in a way 
that is not matched by the actual sources available—or, of 
course, by any source that could ever possibly become availa-
ble. As explained below, these practices are particularly dam-
aging in the context of claims for asylum by lgbtq people.
Suffering in Silence: Difficulties in Corroborating 
Diverse Experiences
“Low-Profile” or “Ordinary” Applicants
Very few applicants for asylum will be able to point to coun-
try information that is about them, personally, and that inde-
pendently corroborates who they are, why they fear harm 
in their country of origin, and what will happen to them if 
they return.35 In most cases, therefore, asylum seekers will 
be required to corroborate their claims for protection by ref-
erence to country information about how similarly situated 
people are treated in their countries of origin. Such informa-
tion may be expressed in general terms—for example, the 
assertion that “Tamils throughout [Sri Lanka], but especially 
in the north and east, reported security forces regularly 
surveilled or harassed members of their community.”36 It 
may also consist of references to the experiences of specific 
individuals other than the applicant whose claims are being 
considered—for example, the assertion that “an overseas 
travel ban on human rights activist Balendran Jeyakumari … 
was imposed for an indefinite period.”37 
Even this information, however, may be of limited useful-
ness or applicability. Whereas country information generally 
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abounds with coverage of the treatment of “high-profile” 
victims (whether that profile predates their experiences of 
persecution or is a result of their unique experience of per-
secution), it is often less capable of providing a full account 
of the lives of “ordinary,” “low-profile” people, and of how 
they are likely to be regarded by potential agents of perse-
cution. Although, for example, attacks on prominent lgbtq 
individuals or attacks with unusually severe consequences or 
characteristics may receive media attention, not every act of 
homophobic violence will receive equivalent coverage—and 
still less in outlets to which rsd officials have access. This 
has implications beyond merely meaning that “ordinary” 
applicants cannot provide direct corroboration for claimed 
attacks; it can lead to the distorted impression that only 
high-profile individuals are at risk, or that the small sample 
of abuses that are publicised are, in fact, the only instances 
of such attacks.
This lack of evidence regarding the treatment of “ordinary” 
individuals may result from a focus upon high-profile inci-
dents of violence, or “only the most egregious” situations,38 
rather than the broader effects of discrimination, ostracism, 
and social stigma—paralleling longstanding allegations that 
international ngos unduly neglect deprivations of social 
and economic rights in their reportage.39 This focus upon 
particular forms of abuse may also derive from the fact that 
such abuses can retain their shocking or shameful quality 
removed from context (because of the universal comprehen-
sibility of physical harm), and hence remain recognizable to 
various imagined audiences of “country information”—such 
as readers of newspapers based in the West, privileged com-
munities in countries of origin, or constituencies invested in 
the work of international ngos.
The question of “privilege” under the Refugees Convention 
is not new. It has, for example, previously been considered 
in terms of the unique opportunities enjoyed by individu-
als able to reach countries of asylum, as opposed to equally 
deserving individuals “left behind” (popularized by the 
notion of “queue jumpers”);40 in terms of gender, including 
“refugee law’s bias towards recognition of masculinised expe-
riences”;41 or by reference to the disproportionate chances of 
success in rsd enjoyed by applicants with legal assistance.42 
However, it is also possible to speak of the privileges enjoyed 
by certain applicants in rsd through the disproportionate 
representation of the experiences of similarly placed people 
in country information, and the corresponding disadvan-
tages faced by other (often “ordinary”) applicants whose 
experiences do not receive the same coverage. Individuals 
who enjoy politically or personally privileged positions in 
countries of origin—whether in terms of gender, race, class, 
social standing, or otherwise—may enjoy greater oppor-
tunities to have their experiences reproduced in country 
information. This inequality is compounded by difficulties 
faced by ngos, particularly ngos without international back-
ing, in investigating and publishing information.43 Beyond 
chronicling disadvantages, how these “privileged” individu-
als experience and express their sexual orientation or gender 
identity may differ from less-privileged individuals—con-
tributing to what Juss terms “the conceptualisation today of 
refugee rights as bourgeoisie rights.”44
These “privileges” enjoyed by some lgbtq people are, 
of course, no answer to the disadvantages that these same 
“privileged” applicants will face on other fronts. Individuals 
may enjoy a privileged position in publicising their struggle 
and in representation in sources of country information, or 
other forms of privilege within their country of origin gener-
ally, while at the same time facing serious risks of persecution 
on account of their sexual orientation or gender identity. Not 
even the experiences of these individuals can be assumed to 
receive appropriate coverage, whether because state persecu-
tion of lgbtq people may extend to the suppression of inter-
national or national groups that advocate for their cause45 
or even because of homophobia of domestic human rights 
bodies who would otherwise champion civil rights against 
the state.46
Distortion in favour of particular incidents, particular 
individuals, or particular subgroups is not restricted solely 
to lgbtq claimants. It is often difficult to establish an 
endemic pattern of abuses, or to assert the frequency with 
which abuses occur, on the basis of country information that 
attests to past examples of persecution, simply because the 
day-to-day experiences of “ordinary” individuals are diffi-
cult to deduce or infer from the unrepresentative sample of 
abuses that do receive reportage.47 The unique experiences 
of high-profile individuals must be understood in terms of 
their specific circumstances—that is, whether they are more 
or less likely to suffer particular forms of abuse as a result of 
their personal profile and its sources. Those experiences may 
have limited use in assessing the experiences of other people 
who possess different levels of privilege or disadvantage.48
Intersectional Claims
Asylum seekers may have multiple, overlapping claims for 
protection. These claims cannot be assessed in a vacuum; 
instead, the “potential cumulative effect” of an applicant’s 
claims and personal circumstances must be assessed.49 Even 
if no single part of an asylum seeker’s profile would of itself 
be sufficient to attract adverse interest, individuals may be 
at risk of persecution because aspects of their profile may 
exacerbate the risks associated with other aspects. For exam-
ple, lesbians, bisexual women, or trans women may face risks 
of persecution as a result of their gender identity or sexual 
orientation and because of discrimination against women in 
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general, while, in turn, facing greater risks than they would 
face on account of any single one of these characteristics. 
Millbank notes in this regard that claims for protection 
brought by lesbian asylum seekers in Canada and Australia 
disproportionately involve experiences of sexual assault, 
even beyond the high rates of sexual violence reported by 
lgbtq claimants for asylum as a whole as part of their claims 
for protection.50 These claims should not be viewed simply 
in terms of violence against women, or in terms of the acces-
sibility of support services intended for women as a whole; 
the role of state and societal homophobia in prompting such 
attacks or restricting access to redress must be considered.51 
The term lgbtq needs dissection in this regard. Although 
this initialism is used as shorthand in this article, the term 
disguises the extraordinary diversity of human experiences 
of sexuality and gender by conflating the potentially very dif-
ferent experiences of different sexual minorities. Where, for 
example, country information documents the experiences of 
men who engage in same-sex sexual conduct, it should not 
be assumed to reflect the experiences of lesbians, bisexual 
people, or trans people. Where country information is 
produced by gay men—who may, by virtue of their gender, 
face reduced social barriers in telling and publicizing their 
stories than cis or trans women—it should not be assumed 
to be free from societal prejudices against lesbians, bisexual 
people, or trans women (potentially even exhibiting sexism 
and/or transphobia) or immune to, or even conscious of, the 
privileges enjoyed by gay men by virtue of their gender. More 
broadly, country information produced by one subset of the 
lgbtq community may replicate or ignore that subgroup’s 
privileges (social, economic, gendered, or otherwise). 
Intersectional claims create difficulty in using country 
information. Sources assessing or documenting risks faced by 
lgbtq people may be (understandably) written with regard 
to harm attributable explicitly to victims’ sexual orientation 
or gender identity, without focusing on elevated risks faced 
by some individuals on account of different characteristics—
carrying out, in the process, what Kimberlé Crenshaw terms 
the “elision of difference” in non-intersectional identity poli-
tics.52 Even where such accounts purport to merely docu-
ment the experiences or cultural assumptions of particular 
groups, they may inappropriately conflate the experiences of 
various sexual minorities—for example, erasing the distinct 
experiences of lesbians through blanket references to “the 
non-gendered but male-centred category of ‘homosexual,’” 
or through the use of country information solely regard-
ing the treatment of gay men to assess the claims of lesbian, 
bisexual, or trans asylum seekers.53 
Similarly, reports of racial or religious discrimination 
may focus upon those aspects without considering inter-
sectional forms of harm for particular members of minority 
communities, including lgbtq people who are also mem-
bers of racial or religious minorities. Various overlapping 
facets of identity shape individual experiences of “realisation 
or violation of human rights”;54 reports purporting to docu-
ment such violations should make clear (as far as possible) 
varied experiences of persecution or the extent to which per-
secution may result from an aggregate of different factors.55 
Accounts of the causes of particular human rights abuses 
must draw upon, not merely make “passing references” to,56 
the diverse experiences of differently placed individuals.
As noted above, country information may dispropor-
tionately represent the experiences of “privileged” individu-
als—whether because those individuals whose experiences 
are studied or who are able to attest to particular conditions 
speak the same language as interlocutors, because they are 
familiar with civil society or legal mechanisms to publicize 
particular abuses (or are themselves directly involved in pro-
ducing country information), or because their experiences 
are seen as more relatable or of greater interest to intended 
audiences. Individuals who suffer from multiple intersecting 
forms of disadvantage face correspondingly greater barriers 
to having their stories heard and, in turn, to ensuring that 
their disadvantage is reflected in available sources of country 
information; they risk being diminished by the preference 
in human rights fact-finding for a “single story” in which 
diverse experiences are blurred or diminished.57 This ten-
dency may be compared to asylum advocates’ presentation 
of “simplistic, even derogatory characterizations of asylum 
seekers’ countries of origin, as areas of barbarism or lack 
of civility in order to present a clear-cut picture of persecu-
tion.”58 Decision-makers, advocates, and governments alike 
have an interest in the preservation of neat, simple stories 
of who is at risk in other nations and who is not, from the 
point of view of researching claims, placing claims within a 
Convention framework and deciding claims. The experience 
of intersectional persecution, in which individuals’ claims 
do not turn on singular characteristics capable of expression 
in template submissions or being dispensed with in template 
decisions, cuts against this interest. (The dangers of undue 
generalization or “simplicity” in this regard are evident in 
the case study of MD, considered below.)
“Discreet” or “Ashamed” Applicants
Not all asylum seekers have necessarily suffered persecution. 
Past harm is not a prerequisite for refugee status, which turns 
instead upon whether individuals have a “well-founded 
fear” of persecution if removed to their country of origin. 
Although rsd officials may grant greater credence to a fear 
of harm if that harm has, in fact, occurred in the past, a fear 
can be credible even if applicants have been lucky or cau-
tious enough to ensure their own safety to date. In particular, 
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asylum seekers may have been able to escape harm in the 
past by concealing their identities, or those aspects of them-
selves that would otherwise have attracted persecution. They 
cannot, however, be expected or required to resume such 
secrecy if removed to their countries of origin, even if it has 
kept them safe to date.59
lgbtq asylum seekers may not have been open about 
their orientation or identity prior to leaving their country of 
origin. They may, for example, have concealed these aspects 
because of their own “feelings of shame and the conscious-
ness of being the subject of disapproval or disgrace” as a result 
of prevailing societal homophobia,60 including internalized 
homophobia.61 The fact that many lgbtq people in nations 
with persecutory laws or societal customs do live “quietly” 
or “discreetly,” whether by choice or fear, makes it difficult to 
prove the risks that they would face if they were to be open 
about their sexual orientation or gender identity. 
In examining country information about states where 
most lgbtq people hide their identities, it can be difficult 
to determine the level of risk that individuals would face if 
they were to reveal their sexual orientation or gender iden-
tity. Where individuals in these circumstances do suffer 
harm, they may fail to report it, whether to state authori-
ties or to ngos, for fear of further discovery. It may not be 
clear if reported incidents of abuse represent isolated events 
unrepresentative of broader social attitudes or are, in fact, 
the inevitable or likely consequences for those few individu-
als whose sexuality is open or discovered. That is to say, one 
cannot necessarily extrapolate from circumstances of wide-
spread repression and concealment what would happen to 
individuals who refuse to conceal their sexual orientation or 
gender identity, simply because these individuals are so rare 
and so exceptional. Silence in country information creates 
the illusion of safety.
To the extent that the experiences of some lgbtq people 
in countries of origin are known, rsd officials must consider 
the extent whether such experiences are representative of 
the lgbtq population as a whole (or, to be precise, of that 
particular subset to which an individual applicant belongs) 
and whether those experiences reflect the likely outcome 
of lgbtq asylum seekers being open about their sexual 
orientation or gender identity upon return to their country 
of origin. In doing so, rsd officials must consider whether 
individuals who are able to openly profess their sexual ori-
entation or gender identity in their country of origin, and 
whose experiences are known from country information, 
are exceptional in some respect—for example, whether they 
enjoy economic, social, or political capital that allow them 
to be open about their sexuality in a way that most individu-
als would not, and hence whether individuals who would 
otherwise be too discreet or ashamed to reveal their true 
orientations or identities would face entirely different, and 
potentially far graver, circumstances upon their return. (This 
requires, again, distinctions to be drawn within the category 
of “lgbtq.”)
Atypical Applicants
Individual experiences of sexuality and gender are uniquely 
personal.62 Even where asylum seekers’ understandings of 
their sexual orientation or gender identity are informed by 
culture, or by participation in a given subculture, everyone 
will understand and express their sexual orientation and/or 
gender identity in a manner informed by their own experi-
ences and outlook. rsd officials must not assume that par-
ticular, culturally specific modes in which sexuality may be 
expressed or manifested will determine, or even influence, 
asylum seekers’ lived experiences—whether such modes are 
the product of rsd officials’ own cultures or are predominant 
in the countries from which asylum seekers have come.63 
rsd officials should not, for example, assume that individu-
als who fear harm because they have engaged in same-sex 
sexual conduct identify with any particular sexual minor-
ity or as possessing a given orientation or identity. This is 
because of the extent to which self-identification may be 
shaped by cultural context, including shame and stigma, and, 
more broadly, because individual narratives of “self ” should 
not be assumed to be predictable or uniform in this man-
ner.64 The process of relating to another individual’s experi-
ences of sexuality and culture, and in turn considering these 
experiences in terms of the criteria for refugee status, is one 
that requires “empathy and imagination.”65 
Whereas country information may be used to provide 
a general impression of the circumstances of a particular 
group in a particular nation, or to provide some basis for 
assessing whether claimed actions or events are plausible, 
it cannot substitute for individualized assessment. The fact 
that other individuals, even individuals from a similar per-
sonal or cultural background, acted or were treated in a par-
ticular manner does not mean that this would be precisely 
replicated in every subsequent circumstance. In particular, 
the fact that given actions—whether by the asylum seeker, 
the feared agents of persecution, or someone else entirely—
are not “reasonable” does not mean that such actions are 
not “plausible.” Just as, for example, it may be plausible for 
politically committed individuals to act upon and express 
their political beliefs even where it is not in their interests 
to do so,66 so too individual actions are not always purely 
the result of context (that is, what their cultural or historical 
background dictates) or a utilitarian calculus; people do not 
always act consistently or rationally.67 Country information, 
in demonstrating how similarly placed individuals would act, 
cannot be used to discount claims that a person has acted 
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in an exceptional or atypical manner.68 Unlikely events still 
happen. 
This assumption of uniformity poses particular difficulties 
for lgbtq asylum seekers who do not present in a manner 
that comports with the stereotypical assumptions of deci-
sion-makers of how lgbtq people “ought” to act, whether 
in their own country or in the asylum seeker’s country of 
origin. Such determinations turn to a significant extent upon 
whether claimed behaviour fits within “expected norms.”69 
The entire spectrum of human sexual identity cannot be cap-
tured by stereotypical assumptions of this kind. 
As Rehaag has documented,70 bisexual asylum seekers 
face particular difficulty in this regard, whether because of 
the continued belief among decision-makers (or, indeed, 
among individual advocates) that “heteronormative gender 
roles and same-sex sexual desire are somehow mutually 
exclusive”71 or simply because decision-makers and advo-
cates seek to fit individual sexual orientations or identities 
within settled, if unsatisfactory, dichotomies of “innate,” 
“immutable” personal characteristics72 for ease of explana-
tion or disposition73—contrary to lived experiences of fluid 
sexual identities.74 These damaging assumptions stem from 
and perpetuate the “invisibility” of bisexual experiences.75 
As a result, bisexual asylum seekers may be disadvantaged 
through the preponderance of “expected gay narratives” in 
societies in which asylum is sought (even as a product of gay 
activism itself).76 Women may similarly be disadvantaged 
because of the extent to which their sexual or gender iden-
tity self-formation may differ from that of men,77 given the 
dominance of male voices and narratives in the countries in 
which asylum is sought (or even among drafters of country 
information).
These limits to country information must be borne in 
mind in its interpretation and use. The rejection of “stereo-
typy” and undue homogeneity in this regard is important in 
ensuring appropriate outcomes in rsd, in resisting a broader 
tendency towards “cultural arrogance,”78 in rejecting one 
particular model of the “acceptable” lgbtq refugee upon 
asylum seekers and in preventing a regime in which asylum 
seekers are forced to curtail individual self-expression or 
manifestations of identity inconsistent with “the refugee-
granting nation’s image of the ideal refugee.”79
Applicants Who Fear Harm from Inconsistently Applied 
Policies or Laws
In some cases, a nation’s criminal law may formally prohibit 
same-sex conduct or relationships while at the same time 
seldom leading to formal prosecutions. (India is one of these 
nations. How this situation has been viewed in practice in 
rsd is explored in the case study of MD considered below.) 
Prosecutions are not the only way in which such laws are 
employed. Formal criminal prohibitions may be used to 
justify arrests, blackmail, or abusive behaviour by the state, 
or to legitimize discriminatory and oppressive behaviour by 
non-state actors (secure in the knowledge that the state will 
not intervene to protect sexual minorities). While country 
information may be able to document formal prosecutions 
and to record how frequently they occur, researchers face 
far greater obstacles to determining how often and on what 
scale these lower-level forms of abuse arising from prohibi-
tion occur. As LaViolette writes, “It is difficult to rebut the 
presumption of state protection when human rights docu-
mentation is unavailable or provides little information on 
attitudes and actual practice.”80 
Even where, for example, the state maintains a formal 
position of neutrality or tolerance, this may not be honoured 
in practice. State officials may continue to commit abuses 
against lgbtq people in spite of nominal guarantees of 
human rights, whether because lgbtq people are unable to 
access redress against blackmail or extortion or because the 
state is incapable of restraining its own agents from acting 
upon societal homophobia or transphobia. Alternatively, 
violence against lgbtq people may be regional or localized, 
whether because of repressive laws at the subnational level 
or because government officials in some provinces or dis-
tricts act differently from their counterparts elsewhere in the 
nation. State laws should not be used as “a proxy for the com-
posite repression within the state,” whether such repression 
is exerted by state or non-state actors.81 The extent to which 
nominal laws are, in practice, modulated by other moral and 
social norms must be reflected in the production and use of 
country information.
Country information speaks in terms of probability, not 
certainty. It cannot speak of the precise outcomes of particu-
lar situations, or the precise treatment to which particular 
individuals would be subjected upon their return. It merely 
provides a basis for determining the likelihood of particu-
lar scenarios. This is particularly important in assessing the 
potential consequences of laws, policies, or state practices. 
Decision-makers cannot simply take the existence of a par-
ticular law, or the lawfulness of a given practice, to mean that 
that law will be applied uniformly in all circumstances. They 
must instead take into account factors such as corruption, 
scope for arbitrary or capricious behaviour by state officials, 
and (crucially for present purposes) the extent to which 
laws will be differently applied against lgbtq people (or, 
alternatively, against different segments of the lgbtq com-
munity)—including, for example, the use of laws that do not 
explicitly criminalize same-sex sexual conduct to prohibit 
such conduct in practice.82
Denial of access to justice has lasting effects in this regard. 
The arbitrary and unpredictable enforcement of laws thrives 
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in an environment where marginalized communities (includ-
ing lgbtq people) are incapable of accessing the courts or 
enjoying legal or logistical help in preparing and presenting 
claims. Exclusion of lgbtq people from presenting claims 
or defending themselves within the formal legal system 
also prevents abuses of these kinds from being reported or 
brought to light within country information; brief, cursory 
trials or summary decisions are far easier to conceal than 
sustained legal challenges to unjust legal or societal barriers. 
Discrimination and marginalization in countries of origin 
are reflected, even if partially, within country information, 
and hence may be replicated within the rsd process itself. 
Applicants Who Fear Harm from Non-State Actors and 
Families
Many lgbtq asylum seekers fear that they will be harmed 
because of their sexual orientation or gender identity by 
family members, neighbours, or other members of the 
community, and that the state will be unable or unwilling 
to redress such abuses. It is generally accepted that the Refu-
gees Convention provides protection against the actions of 
non-state actors, even where the state is merely unable, as 
opposed to unwilling, to provide protection.83 (Individuals 
may also, as in MD, fear both state and non-state actors.)
Feared abuses by non-state actors may be very difficult 
to corroborate with country information, which is far bet-
ter equipped to discuss state policies, and risks resulting 
from state action, than risks arising from societal or familial 
violence. State actions can often be described in relatively 
uniform terms, applicable to large classes of people. State 
actions can even be attributed to particular documents or 
laws and are in turn capable of redress through “top-down 
legal-institutional reforms.”84 Risks arising from social or 
family attitudes are inchoate, highly variable, and resistant 
to generalization. Country information may, for example, be 
able to attest to widespread societal intolerance, but it cannot 
(usually) substantiate claims that an individual applicant’s 
family are uniquely homophobic or transphobic, or lend 
credence to threats by particular non-state actors—whether 
families, clerics, or vigilante groups—to harm a person in 
a particular way if that person returned. (This is related to 
refugee law’s broader problem in connecting the legal cate-
gory of “persecution” to the complexities in practice of “con-
tingencies of structural violence,”85 and the “state-centricity 
of human rights law” in general.86) This lack of information 
potentially contributes to a “simplifying tendency,” of both 
advocates and decision-makers, in how circumstances or 
attitudes in other countries are regarded,87 or else to a ten-
dency to regard undocumented abuses as being insufficiently 
severe to constitute “persecution.”88
Decision-makers must remain sensitive to the fact that 
not all risks can be corroborated, even by deduction from 
the experiences of others recorded in country information. 
Adverse inferences should not necessarily be drawn about 
applicants’ credibility or the probability of future harm 
simply because their experiences are the product of societal 
attitudes rather than state policies. Such inferences must also 
be avoided where the agents of persecution feared by the asy-
lum seeker, whether a particular family or even a particular 
individual, are outliers or unrepresentative in this regard 
(and not easily proven). Individuals’ ability to live and love 
as they choose cannot be understood solely in terms of those 
individuals’ relationships with the state in their countries of 
origin.
Female applicants may face particular disadvantages in 
this regard. As Millbank has noted regarding hate crimes 
in Australia, “Lesbians face significantly more ‘private’ vio-
lence than gay men—they are more likely to be harassed 
and assaulted at home or at work rather than on the streets, 
and more likely to be attacked by men known to them, such 
as neighbours or former partners.”89 Claims based upon 
treatment of this kind in asylum seekers’ countries of origin 
have historically faced significant difficulties in being char-
acterized as Convention-related90 or as reaching the level 
of severity necessary to amount to “persecution.”91 In addi-
tion, they are less likely to receive the level of attention in 
country information directed towards more “visible” forms 
of persecution (such as violence or penal sanctions), includ-
ing because these same social attitudes may exclude women’s 
stories from available sources.
Case Study: MD (same-sex-oriented males: risk) 
India CG
MD is a gay man and a citizen of India. Because of his sexual 
orientation, he was expelled from his family home, he lost 
his employment in Mumbai, and he was arrested, detained, 
and beaten by police in India.92 He applied for asylum in the 
United Kingdom in November 2007. His claims for asylum 
were finally rejected by the Immigration and Asylum Cham-
ber of the Upper Tribunal on 12 February 2014—two months 
after the Supreme Court of India’s decision in Koushal v Naz 
Foundation (“Koushal”)93 affirmed the constitutionality of 
section 377 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 377 prohibits 
“carnal intercourse against the order of nature” and is widely 
understood to criminalize same-sex sexual conduct.
In MD, the tribunal found that neither MD, nor “same-sex 
oriented males” in general, would face a “real risk” of perse-
cution if removed to India. The tribunal’s findings in MD con-
stitute a “country guidance” decision—that is, its findings 
on which groups are at risk are binding upon future British 
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decision-makers in asylum cases.94 It is hence itself a form 
of country information. This decision has also shaped the UK 
Home Office’s Country Information and Guidance on claims 
for asylum based on sexual orientation and gender identity 
from Indian nationals.95 The decision’s character as a “coun-
try guidance” decision is central to this article’s criticisms of 
its findings. The tribunal did not consider solely whether MD 
would be at risk, but expressed its findings on the risks faced 
by the broader class of “same-sex oriented males.” This is a 
very broad category, overlapping with but not encompassing 
(or necessarily encompassed within) the category of “lgbtq 
people in India.” The breadth and artificiality of this category 
(given the extent to which it groups together a wide array of 
subgroups with which individuals may more readily iden-
tify) creates difficulty in providing precise guidance for how 
claims from this group should be regarded.
The tribunal considered various sources of country 
information, including reports from the UK Home Office, 
the US Department of State, the research divisions of rsd 
institutions in Canada and Australia, and numerous news 
reports.96 The tribunal devoted far more attention in its deci-
sion, however, to the written and oral evidence of Dr. Akshay 
Khanna, at that time a research fellow with the Institute of 
Development Studies at the University of Sussex. The tribu-
nal acknowledged Khanna’s evidence regarding the limited 
reporting and varying impact of abuses97 and his emphasis 
on differential treatment of gay people in India based on 
class. As Khanna stated, “If one is explicit about being gay, 
and is not upper class, it would be difficult to find both 
housing and employment” or to be part of a cohabiting rela-
tionship,98 with poor and working-class same-sex-oriented 
males “being most likely to face extreme violence, exclusion 
and discrimination.”99 Khanna’s evidence was that “‘same-
sex desiring’ males, except those in the upper classes,” were 
at risk of violence, police extortion, and societal discrimina-
tion in India, with lgbt persons in general suffering from a 
lack of police protection.100
In reaching this view, Khanna highlighted limits to avail-
able information. For example, while section 377 has rarely 
led to prosecutions in the higher courts, “that is not to say 
that the provision has not been used in the lower courts,”101 
with no national records to enable a comprehensive analy-
sis.102 Despite Khanna’s caution, the tribunal was satisfied 
that such prosecutions are extremely rare at every level of 
the judiciary, given “the dearth of examples of such prosecu-
tions before us.”103 Equivalent reasons were given, with far 
less justification, for rejecting Khanna’s evidence of endemic 
police violence against lgbtq persons—legitimized and 
shielded by the existence of section 377—in India. Noting 
the existence of “a significant lgbt rights network of ngos in 
India” and litigation in support of lgbtq rights, the tribunal 
asserted (even while accepting that many abuses by police 
go unreported) that “had the practice of violence and black-
mail of lgbt persons by the police been at the level Khanna 
suggested it is, or at such a level that it could be said that 
there is a real risk to any particular same-sex oriented male, 
we would have expected this to have been better reflected by 
the examples of such treatment given in the evidence before 
us.”104 (As explored above, there are myriad potential expla-
nations for such silences in country information.)
The tribunal hence concluded that police violence, extor-
tion, and blackmail against same-sex oriented males in 
India is not “so prevalent as to constitute a real risk to any 
given same-sex oriented male, whatever their class or status 
in Indian society” (emphasis added).105 The tribunal did 
not accept that this state of affairs would be altered by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Koushal.106
Were the tribunal merely assessing MD’s claims for protec-
tion (rather than to formulate a country guidance decision), 
it could have found merely that MD had not established that 
he would face a real risk of police violence, extortion, and 
blackmail upon his return to India (despite his past expe-
riences of abuse by police). In issuing a “country guidance” 
decision, however, the tribunal instead established guide-
lines for the assessment of claims by all “same-sex oriented 
males” from India seeking asylum in the United Kingdom. 
Even to the extent that same-sex oriented men in India do 
not uniformly face a real risk of persecution, regardless of 
their class or status—in India, as elsewhere, class and social 
status are significant factors in how same-sex-oriented 
males, and lgbtq people in general, relate to the state and 
police—the tribunal needed to disaggregate how class and 
status in Indian society relate to the risks faced by same-sex-
oriented males, including from the police. In doing so, the 
tribunal might even have accepted that abuses against lgbtq 
persons from disadvantaged groups are underreported, even 
if unwilling to accept the claimed extent of this underreport-
ing for the community as a whole.
The tribunal similarly did not accept that violence by 
non-state actors demonstrates “that there is a real risk to any 
particular individual of suffering ill treatment at the hands 
of non-state actors,”107 finding that Khanna’s evidence in 
this regard contained “an element of overstatement.”108 Even 
where individuals” personal circumstances create a real risk 
of harm in their home area, the tribunal found that “it would 
not, in general, be unreasonable or unduly harsh for an open 
same-sex oriented male (or a person who is perceived to be 
such), who is able to demonstrate a real risk in his home 
area because of his particular circumstances, to relocate 
internally to a major city within India” (emphasis added).109
The phrase “in general” hides substantial variation. The 
tribunal’s decision presumes that it would be “reasonable” 
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for an individual to relocate within India without disag-
gregating the broad category of “same-sex oriented males” 
and considering risks arising from membership of different 
sexual minority groups, different ways in which sexuality is 
expressed or substantial diversity of class, race, and religion.110 
In defence of the tribunal, it is open to individual applicants 
to whom the country guidance decision in MD may apply to 
argue that it does not apply to their circumstances or to press 
for exclusion from the decision’s broad ambit. Nonetheless, 
decision-makers and authors of country information must 
ensure that these subtle distinctions are not merely waved 
away by noting that their findings are expressed in “general” 
terms, and that diverse lived experiences of discrimination 
and persecution (shaped by privilege and class position) are 
appropriately acknowledged. 
The tribunal hence found that, while MD may face some 
discrimination if removed to India, this discrimination 
would not amount to persecution,111 and that MD would not 
face a real chance of persecution from the state or from non-
state actors, “particularly in one of the major cities.”112 MD 
was not granted protection in the United Kingdom.
Like any form of country information, country guidance 
decisions are undoubtedly difficult to craft. They cannot pro-
vide an exhaustive account of the experiences of entire groups, 
particularly groups so broad as “same-sex oriented males in 
India.” Nonetheless, some approaches to the production and 
employment of country information are inherently flawed. 
These include proceeding on assumptions that the absence of 
particular groups from country information indicates their 
safety, or that the absence of particular forms of abuse from 
country information indicates their non-occurrence.113 They 
also include assertions in general terms about the experi-
ences of a group by reference to the security enjoyed by a 
portion of that group, with only cursory acknowledgment of 
the extent to which those experiences may be mediated by 
other forms of disadvantage. 
Conclusion
The limitations of available country information should 
not serve as a cause for cynicism or hopelessness. Country 
information remains a powerful, indeed indispensable tool 
in rsd, even given such limitations. As Alston and Knuckey 
write with regard to human rights advocacy more broadly, 
“At a certain point, decisions have to be made on the basis 
of the best available evidence.”114 Similarly, in rsd, decisions 
on whether claims for protection are well founded must 
ultimately be made on evidence that is inevitably imperfect 
to some degree, and decision-makers must compensate for 
such imperfections (the “fragility of facts”115) as far as they 
can instead of rejecting any source that falls short of an 
imagined ideal of perfection.116
Nonetheless, these limits do exist and can potentially have 
severe effects on the assessment of the claims of lgbtq asy-
lum seekers. Decision-makers need to be conscious of the 
individual circumstances of applicants before them, includ-
ing that limited country information about those particular 
circumstances is not of itself evidence of the absence of 
abuses; that those individual circumstances may themselves 
be the result of repressive societal attitudes or public poli-
cies; that persecution is not recorded merely by unblinking, 
objective, omniscient narrators, and that persecution affects 
even the means by which it is reported, related, and con-
demned; and that every asylum seeker’s sexual orientation 
or gender identity intersects with other elements of their 
identity. Individual experiences of sexuality and gender can-
not and should not be “generalized” or assumed to follow 
uniform patterns. 
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